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Attribute-Based Access to Scalable Media in
Cloud-Assisted Content Sharing Networks
Yongdong Wu, Zhuo Wei, and Robert H. Deng
Abstract—This paper presents a novel Multi-message Cipher-
text Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (MCP-ABE) technique,
and employs the MCP-ABE to design an access control scheme
for sharing scalable media based on data consumers’ attributes
(e.g., age, nationality, or gender) rather than an explicit list of the
consumers’ names. The scheme is efficient and flexible because
MCP-ABE allows a content provider to specify an access policy
and encrypt multiple messages within one ciphertext such that
only the users whose attributes satisfy the access policy can de-
crypt the ciphertext. Moreover, the paper shows how to support
resource-limited mobile devices by offloading computational
intensive operations to cloud servers while without compromising
data privacy.
Index Terms—Access control, cloud computing, data security
and privacy, scalable media content.
I. INTRODUCTION
C ONTENT sharing environments such as social net-working are very dynamic in terms of the number of
on-line users, storage requirement, network bandwidth, com-
putational capability, applications and platforms, thus it is not
easy for a service provider to allocate resources following
the traditional client-server model. As cloud computing offers
application developers and users an abstract view of services
that hides much of the system details and inner workings, it is
more and more popular in content-sharing applications. How-
ever, the weak security provision of cloud computing services
is delaying their adoption [1]. As a result, it is imperative for
cloud computing based service providers, private or public, to
build security functionalities into their services and manage
their services following prudent security practices [2].
Access control is the fundamental security mechanism to
facilitate information sharing in a controllable manner. It
exerts control over which user can access which resource
based on a permission relationship between user attributes and
resource attributes, where attributes can be any information
deemed relevant for granting access, such as user’s job function
and resource quality, and permission is specified in terms of
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requirements on the attributes of resource and user. Any user
with attributes that meet the requirements has access to that
resource. However, it is challenging to design a suitable access
control mechanism in content sharing services due to: (1)
any individual is able to freely produce any number and any
kind of online media such as text, image, sound, video, and
presentation; (2) any individual is able to grand any access
to his media to anyone, at any time; (3) an individual may
reveal a large number of attributes (e.g., name, age, address,
friendship, classmate, fans, hobby, personal interest, gender,
and mobility), and some of them can be very dynamics; and
(4) individuals may share contents using various devices and
bandwidth, and hence demand different access privileges for
the same media.
A promising approach to access control in content sharing
services is to empower users to enforce access controls on their
data directly, rather than through a central administrator. How-
ever, this requires flexible and scalable cryptographic key man-
agement to support complex access control policies. A naïve
access control solution is to assign one key for each user at-
tribute, distribute the appropriate keys to users who have the
corresponding attributes, and encrypt the media with the at-
tribute keys repeatedly, e.g., the ciphertext is produced as
to protect message with attribute key pair
and cipher . This naïve solution is flexible, but it
is vulnerable to collusion attack. Technically, a user having key
for one attribute and another user having key for an-
other attribute can collude to decrypt ciphertext to . In other
words, two users having one attribute each are able to conspire
to have the same capability as a user having those two attributes
in the näive scheme. Another method is to classify users into dif-
ferent roles based on their attributes, assign role keys to users,
and then encrypt the content using the role keys. However, this
approach results in high complexity, i.e., the number of keys
for each user and the number of ciphertexts for one message
are on the order of where is the number of all pos-
sible user attributes. Both of these solutions suffer from the rigid
and inflexible definition of the underlying access control poli-
cies. A remedy to this problem is employing Ciphertext Policy
Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) [3]. In CP-ABE, a ci-
phertext is embedded with an access control policy, or access
policy for short, associated with user attributes. A recipient of
the ciphertext is able to decrypt the ciphertext only if her at-
tributes satisfy the access policy in the ciphertext. CP-ABE can
be viewed as a one-to-many public key encryption scheme and
hence enables a data owner to grant access to an unknown set
of users. Nonetheless, existing CP-ABE schemesmerely deliver
one encrypted message per ciphertext to all authorized users and
are not optimal for efficient sharing of scalable media.
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In this paper we present an access control scheme for scalable
media. The scheme has several benefits whichmake it especially
suitable for content delivery. For example, it is extremely scal-
able by allowing a data owner to grant data access privileges
based on the data consumers’ attributes (e.g., age, nationality,
gender) rather than an explicit list of user names; and it en-
sures data privacy and exclusiveness of access of scalable media
by employing attribute-based encryption. For this purpose, we
introduce a novel Multi-message Ciphertext Policy Attribute-
Based Encryption (MCP-ABE) technique. MCP-ABE encrypts
multiple messages within one ciphertext so as to enforce flex-
ible attribute-based access control on scalable media. Specifi-
cally, the scheme constructs a key graph which matches users’
access privileges, encrypts media units with the corresponding
keys, and then encrypts the key graph with MCP-ABE; only
those data consumers with the required user attributes can de-
crypt the encryption of the key (sub)graph and then decrypt
the encrypted media units. To cater for resource-limited mo-
bile devices, the scheme offloads computational intensive op-
erations to cloud servers while without compromising user data
privacy. Attribute-based encryption schemes, such as CP-ABE
and MCP-ABE, are designed to be secure against user collusion
attacks. The present scheme is also secure against user collu-
sion attacks due to use of attribute-based encryption. The ex-
periments demonstrate that the present scheme is applicable on
smartphone, especially when a cloud platform is available.
The reminder of the paper is arranged as follows. Section II
provides an overview of the related work. Section III presents
the necessary cryptographic and security primitives. Section IV
shows the architecture and operations of cloud-assisted media
sharing. Section V introduces MCP-ABE and a novel access
control scheme based on MCP-ABE. Section VI analyzes the
access control scheme in terms of security, flexibility and oper-
ational overhead. Section VII presents the experiment results.
Finally, Section VIII presents some concluding remarks and fu-
ture work.
II. RELATED WORK
Fundamental to usage control model [8] is the concept of at-
tributes attached to both users and resources. In content sharing
applications, as mapping between user identity and resource is
dynamic, access control methods related to our work can be
classified into two categories.
A. User Attribute Oriented Access Control
EASiER [9] is an architecture that supports fine-grained ac-
cess control policies and dynamic group membership by using
CP-ABE scheme. In addition, EASiER is able to revoke a user
without issuing new keys to other users or re-encrypting existing
ciphertexts by using a proxy.
Yu et al. [10] employed KP-ABE (Key Policy Attribute based
Encryption [11]) to enforce access policies based on data at-
tributes. Their scheme allows data owners to delegate most of
the computation tasks involved in fine-grained data access con-
trol to untrusted cloud servers without disclosing the underlying
data contents by combining techniques of attribute-based en-
cryption, proxy re-encryption, and lazy re-encryption.
Pirretti et al. [12] proposed an information management ar-
chitecture using CP-ABE and optimized security enforcement
efficiency. Furthermore, they employed the architecture and
optimization method on two example applications: an HIPAA
(Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) com-
pliant distributed file system and a content delivery network.
Akinyele et al. [13] designed and implemented a self-pro-
tecting electronic medical records (EMRs) using both CP-ABE
and KP-ABE. In order to protect individual items within an
EMR, each item is encrypted independently with its own ac-
cess control policy.
Persona [14] enables access control by employing a combina-
tion of traditional public key cryptography and attribute-based
encryption scheme. The combination of classical public-key
schemes and ABE schemes has the drawback of increased key
management complexity.
The above attribute-based access control methods enable
flexible access policies for the users. However, they treated
media content as a single monolithic object, ignoring the struc-
ture of the content. Hence, these schemes are not suitable for
access control to scalable multimedia content.
B. Media Structure Oriented Access Control
The SSS (Secure Scalable Streaming) encryption method
[15] for scalable video is a progressive encryption technique.
As SSS encryption may result in decryption failures due to
package loss [16], it should be integrated with error correction
techniques in practice so as to overcome this problem. By
exploiting the JPEG2000 property of “ encode once, decode
many ways ”, Wu et al. [17] designed an access control scheme
which is efficient and secure. More importantly, the scheme is
extremely flexible as its “ encrypt once, decrypt many ways ”
property is completely compatible with the feature of the JPEG
2000 image code-streams.
An MPEG4 [18] stream may have two types of quality scal-
abilities—either PSNR or bit rate scalability. Zhu et al. [19]
proposed access control schemes for streams encoded by the
MPEG-4 Fine Granularity Scalability (FGS) standard so as to
allow a single encrypted stream to support both types of scala-
bilities simultaneously.
H.264/SVC [20] is an efficient video codec standard which
specifies temporal, quality and spatial scalabilities. Selective en-
cryption (e.g.,[21], [22], [23], [24]) encrypts portions of the bit-
stream such as sign ofmotion vector so as to protect the SVC bit-
stream in a fast and flexible way. However, selective encryption
is usually insecure. By exploiting the tree-structures of H.264
SVC bitstreams, schemes in[25], [26] produce secure scalable
bitstreams with relatively high overhead.
All the above media structure based access control schemes
exploit the format of media data to generate protected objects so
that users with the necessary keys can decrypt the corresponding
ciphertext. These schemes are limited to efficient key genera-
tions and normally assume the existence of an online key dis-
tribution center; and they don’t deal with access policies, e.g.,
how to assign user attributes to access privileges.
III. PRELIMINARIES
To make the paper self-contained, this section introduces
the basic concepts of one-way hash function, bilinear map,
access tree, and CP-ABE [3]. For simplicity, we assume that
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the data owner is a male while a data consumer is a female in
the following.
Notations
For ease of reference, important notations used throughout
the paper are listed below.
Access tree, the graph representation of an access
policy.
The node of tree , is the root of the tree.
The set of leaf nodes of tree .
The set of user attributes associated with the set .
The set of attributes of a user.
The user attribute, represented as a string.
Attribute authority.
A bilinear map function.
The input group of bilinear map .
The order of , i.e., has elements.
ZZ The set of integers .
The generator of . ZZ .
The output group of bilinear map .
The public key of an ABE scheme.
The master key of an ABE scheme.
The secret key of a user, issued by AA.
The unit of a media content.
The privilege with as the lowest privilege.
The unit key for encrypting unit .
The enabling block of unit keys.
The concatenation of string and string .
The number of elements in set .
One-way hash function for hashing an attribute.
One-way hash function for hashing a unit key.
A. One-Way Hash Function
A hash function takes a variable-length input string and con-
verts it into a fixed-length output string, called a hash value. A
one-way hash function, denoted as , works in one direc-
tion only: it is easy to compute a hash value from
a pre-image ; however, given an image , it is hard to find a
pre-image such that . There are many one-way hash
functions, such as SHA-1 [4].
B. Bilinear Map
Let and be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime
order , and is a generator of . A bilinear map
has the following properties:
Fig. 1. Access tree—the graph representation of access policy. In this example,
there are four attributes, and the Boolean function representation of the access
policy is . If an user has attribute , is assigned
to be TRUE.
• Bilinearity: for all and ZZ , we have
;
• Non-degeneracy: .
where both the group operation in and the bilinear map
are efficiently computable. The input group in a bilinear map
is usually a point group over an elliptic (or hyperelliptic) curve.
C. Access Tree
In any access control scheme, there is an access policy which
defines the access conditions under which a subject can access
an object. An access tree is a graph representation of the ac-
cess policy. Such a tree includes non-leaf nodes and leaf nodes.
Each leaf node is associated with a user attribute (e.g., age,
gender, profession), while each non-leaf node has child nodes
which may be leaf nodes, other non-leaf nodes or both. The
root, a special non-leaf node, has no parent node. Without loss
of generality, we tag the nodes in an access tree as follows. The
root node is tagged with 1, and all the other nodes are
tagged with sequentially. For simplicity, this
paper refers a node using either or interchangeably un-
less otherwise stated. Each non-leaf node is associated with
a Boolean function derived from the access policy1. With ref-
erence to Fig. 1, the Boolean function of non-leaf node is
represented with , which means that has child nodes,
and its Boolean value is evaluated to be TRUE if it has at least
child nodes whose Boolean functions are evaluated to be TRUE.
For instance, the Boolean function for node is 2/3, or equiva-
lently , and it’s TRUE if and .
Note that we use to denote a Boolean variable which takes
value TRUE if the attribute .
We say that the set of attributes of a user satisfies the ac-
cess tree if =TRUE, which is iteratively defined as fol-
lows. For any leaf node which is associated with an attribute
, its Boolean value is TRUE. For any non-leaf node, its
Boolean value is the value of its Boolean function. If and only
if the root node’s Boolean value is TRUE, then =TRUE.
For example, given an attribute universe , let
the access policy be “ if AND Any two out of three in set
are included in set , the access is granted ”, the
1This paper focuses on binary attribute value as a multi-level valued attribute
can be represented by several binary valued attributes.
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TABLE I
EVALUATION OF THE ACCESS TREE IN FIG. 1.
access tree in Fig. 1 is the graph representation of the access
policy. Table I lists some results on with respect to var-
ious user attributes .
D. Ciphertext Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
In a CP-ABE scheme, every user’s personal secret key is as-
sociated with a set of attributes while every ciphertext is asso-
ciated with an access policy. A user successfully decrypts a ci-
phertext only if her set of attributes satisfies the access policy
specified in the ciphertext. We briefly describe the CP-ABE in
[3] below. We will extend this CP-ABE scheme to MCP-ABE
scheme and use the latter in our access control scheme.
• AB-Setup : is an initialization algorithm run by an At-
tribute Authority (AA). It takes as input a security param-
eter and outputs a public key and a master secret key
. Specifically, AA chooses a group of prime order
with generator . Next it chooses two random exponents
ZZ , and outputs the public key
and the master key .
• AB-KeyGen : is run by AA to issue a personal
secret key to a user. It takes as input and the set of
attributes of the user, and outputs the personal secret key
associated with . Specifically, for each user, AA first
randomly chooses ZZ , and ZZ , . Then
AA gives the user
as her personal secret key, where is a one-way func-
tion, and an attribute is represented as a string.
• AB-Encrypt : is run by a data owner to encrypt
a message according to an access tree . Technically, for
each node in tree , the data owner selects a polynomial
, sets the degree where is a threshold
such that node is TRUE if it has child nodes whose
Boolean values are TRUE. Furthermore, for the root node
, select a random ZZ , let and let other
points of the polynomial randomly. For any non-root
node in the tree, choose a polynomial by letting
be , and be random . The
ciphertext is given by
(1)
(2)
where attribute is associated with a leaf node
, is the set of attributes, and is the set of leaf nodes.
• AB-Decrypt : is run by a data consumer
in possession of a set of attributes and the secret key
in order to decrypt the ciphertext with an access policy
. Specifically, for any node in ,
(a) If is a leaf node and is associated with attribute
, set the Boolean value of node to
TRUE, and calculate
(3)
where the last three equations are due to the bilin-
earity property given in Section III-C; otherwise set
(i.e., Boolean function value of node is
not TRUE).
(b) If is a non-leaf node, let be its arbitrary -sized
set of child nodes whose . If no such set
exists, i.e., node does not satisfy the access policy,
set ; otherwise, let Boolean function value of
node be TRUE, and compute
(4)
where the Lagrange coefficient polynomial is
(c) For the root , the output in step (b) is
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Fig. 2. Architecture of a cloud-assisted network, where IdP (Identity Provider)
is used to authenticate users to the media provider.
Therefore, the decrypted message is
IV. MEDIA SHARING IN CLOUD ENVIRONMENT
A. System Architecture
With reference to Fig. 2, a media sharing application in cloud
environment is composed of the following parties: backend
servers, foreground servers, AA, and data consumers (or users).
Backend server is part of the infrastructure of the cloud
computing platform. According to the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) [5], cloud computing is a
model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access
to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g.,
networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can
be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal manage-
ment effort or service provider’s interaction. Cloud computing
platforms are assumed to have abundant storage capacity and
computation power. Hence, from the viewpoints of network
service providers, cloud computing significantly decreases the
traffic and storage requirements incurred by their applications.
Foreground server provides the services which are always
online. A server is often operated by a cloud service provider
(CSP), but sometimes, a user is able to run his/her own services
on the cloud platform too. The foreground services may include
web service, database service, media maker service, media de-
coding service, identity management service, etc.
Attribute Authority (AA), a trusted third party [6], sets up the
system parameters of attribute-based encryption system (such
as system-wide public key and master key ), verifies
every user’s attributes (e.g., group membership, role, security
clearance or authorization information) and issues personal se-
cret key corresponding to the set of attributes of the user. In
practice, there could be multiple AAs in a system. For example,
Fig. 3. Mapping between media units and privileges.
a university or corporate may run an AA, and a user may act as
an AA for his/her extended family members. To keep the pre-
sentation simple, we assume a single AA in the rest of the paper.
User may be a data owner, or a data consumer, or both. A
data owner produces (protected or unprotected) media content
(text, voice, video, etc.), and uploads the media content to cloud
servers. To enforce access control to his data, the data owner as-
signs access privileges to data consumers whom the data owner
may or may not know. A data consumer downloads media con-
tent of her interest from cloud servers, and obtains the content
based on her attributes and the access policy of the data owner.
To this end, the data consumer must obtain from AA a personal
secret key bound to her set of attributes.
In this data owner-consumer model, the backend servers pro-
vide the fundamental platform for storage, networking, etc; the
foreground servers provide the interface for media generation,
transmission, and computational assistance to users; while AA
issues personal secret keys so that access control can be en-
forced flexibly based on user attributes and media scalability.
B. Data Structure of Media
In media sharing applications, files of almost all formats
could be exchanged. Particularly, for some media file formats
such as text, PDF, Microsoft word, JPEG2000, H.26x, SVC
files, and presentations, their content can be segmented into
logical units. Each unit itself is meaningful, and more units
provide more information. Thus, different sets of units can
be viewed by different groups of consumers. We refer to
such media content as scalable media content. For example,
assuming that an SVC video file includes one base layer and
two enhancement layers, we may assign three access privileges
to users. If the unit for base layer is assigned to a consumer,
she obtains a video experience of basic quality, but if the
base layer and the two enhancement layers are available, the
video shown to her will be of full fidelity. Fig. 3 illustrates a
mapping between access privileges and media units, where a
consumer with privilege is allowed to access media units
. To simplify the description and without
loss of generality, we will assume the linear mapping given in
Fig. 3 in the following.
V. ACCESS CONTROL ON SCALABLE MEDIA
Components in an attribute-based access control scheme in-
cludes subjects each specified by a set of attributes, objects and
access policies. For example, a user’s age, reputation, role are
the subject attributes, while SVC stream files or presentation
files are objects. An access policy defines the minimal attribute
set which a subject should have in order to access the object.
Therefore, the challenge in attribute-based access control is how
to provide flexible and fine-grained access control at low cost.
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In this section, we first present a security model. We then in-
troduce an attribute-based access control scheme for scalable
media based on a novel MCP-ABE scheme, an extension of the
CP-ABE in [3].
A. Security Model
In the architecture described in Section IV-A, AA is a trusted
authority which is responsible for issuing personal secret keys
for consumers. Cloud servers are assumed to be honest but cu-
rious [7]. That is, they perform system operations faithfully, but
try to find out as much information about consumers as pos-
sible. A consumer may be under the control of an adversary, and
hence compromised such that she would attempt to access data
beyond the scope of her access privileges. In addition, cloud
servers might collude with a polynomial number of consumers.
Communication channels between the data owners, data con-
sumers and the cloud servers are assumed to be insecure.
B. Overview of the Access Control Scheme
Without loss of generality, assuming a media content consists
of units , and its first units are organized
into an access level which is accessible by a user with privi-
lege , , define a binary dominant relation on the
set of privileges : if and only if ,
i.e.,
1) ;
2) , ;
3)
In order to implement flexible access control for the scalable
media content , a data owner uses a unit key
to encrypt the media unit into a ciphertext unit with a
standard symmetric cipher such as AES, . There-
fore, the access control problem is: given that a consumer has
the attributes corresponding to access privilege and the ci-
phertext units , how can she obtain all the unit
keys ?
The solution to the above problem is as follows. Initially,
AA runs the algorithm AB-Setup in Section III-E to obtain the
public key
and the master key . Then AA publishes the
public key to all users, and issues a personal secret key
to every user using the algorithm AB-KeyGen . When a data
owner wants to share a media content with
others, he creates the access policy by mapping attributes of po-
tential data consumers to the privilege levels ,
and calls algorithm Data packing in Section V-C to produce
a package including protected media content and an enabling
block. After receiving the package, a data consumer whose at-
tributes match the access policy of privilege , calls the algo-
rithm Data unpacking in Section V-D to recover the unit keys
and further decrypts the protected media in the
package to the media units .
C. Data Packing
As stated in Section V-B, the data owner aims to create a
media content with units that can be ac-
cessed by others at privilege levels. To this end, he selects the
unit key from ZZ randomly, and generates a hash chain for
unit keys as
(5)
where is a one-way function, is the concatenation
of string and string .
Next, the data owner encrypts the data unit using the cor-
responding and a symmetric cipher . Finally, he selects an
attribute set according to the access policy, and builds an ac-
cess tree whose leaf nodes are associated with . Specifically,
the access tree has a “trunk” and some “branches”, where
the “trunk” consists of nodes ; node
is mapped to privilege level . Each node in
the “trunk” is the root of a subtree which has leaf nodes corre-
sponding to a subset of . In order to protect all the unit keys ,
we extend CP-ABE in Section III-E to MCP-ABE as follows.
The data owner chooses a random value ZZ and
publishes the ciphertext as :
(6)
(7)
(8)
In (6), is the encryption of message with unit
key and a standard symmetric cipher . In (7), is the
enabling block for recovering unit keys by authorized data con-
sumers, is the set of leaf nodes in the tree and is
associated with leaf node .
Remark: the difference on between CP-ABE and
MCP-ABE comes from and . As there are mes-
sages (i.e., unit keys) encrypted in the ciphertext of
MCP-ABE, MCP-ABE is able to encrypt multiple messages
within one ciphertext.
D. Data Unpacking
When a data consumer with personal secret key and
attribute set receives the ciphertext , she computes
as described in Section III-E.
That is, she calculates of every node using either (3)
(for leaf node ) or (4) (for non-leaf node ). Let be
the highest privilege level granted to the data consumer, she
calculates
(9)
Furthermore, she computes
(10)
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Fig. 4. Access tree for the example, where the arrows in the tree “trunk” indi-
cate dependence of unit keys.
so as to derive all the unit keys granted to her. After obtaining
all the necessary unit keys, she can then recover all the media
units from .
E. Example
We use an example to further illustrate how the proposed ac-
cess control scheme works. Assume that a data owner intends
to share his presentation , where is a text
file, is the base layer (BL) of an SVC video and is the
enhancement layer (EL) of the same SVC video. He builds a
unit key chain and the access tree as shown in
Fig. 4. The data owner encrypts the presentation text, base layer
and enhancement layer using the corresponding unit keys.
The present access control scheme is very expressive. Table II
shows a portion of the access policies for the example. User 1
who has attribute only, can not recover any unit key, and
hence has no access to the presentation at all. Neither does User
2. User 3 has attributes , hence, she is able to com-
pute with the algorithm in Section III-E, but can recover nei-
ther nor . Thus, User 3 is able to obtain from (9) for
decrypting the text . User 4 has attributes , and
is able to recover because the polynomial has de-
gree 2, and thus she can obtain the text and the base layer
of the SVC video. User 5 has attributes , and is able to
obtain , and derive using (10). User 6 is able to recover
because she has attributes and to compute and attribute
to compute . She can then calculate the key using (9)
and obtain the entire key chain from (10). As a result, User 6
has access to the entire presentation.
VI. DISCUSSIONS
A. Cloud-Assisted Decryption
In the data unpacking process, a data consumer has to call
the decryption algorithm or repeat-
edly. For each invocation, (i.e., (3)) has 2 bilinear
map operations, while (i.e., (4)) has some mod-
ular exponentiation operations. Thus, the unpacking process is
computationally intensive for resource constrained devices such
as smartphones. To reduce the computational burden of such de-
TABLE II
SOME ACCESS POLICIES FOR THE EXAMPLE.
vices, we propose to offload the decryption operations to a cloud
server. In order to guarantee security, it is important that no in-
formation is leaked to network attackers and the cloud server.
To this end, the data consumer selects a random ZZ after
she registers to the AA, and blinds her secret as
She sends and to the cloud server after regis-
tration. In the decryption process, she sends the ciphertext
to the cloud server. With reference to (3), the cloud server is
able to calculate
(11)
for the leaf node associated with attribute , ,
where (11) holds due to the property of bilinear map in
Section III-C. Moreover, with reference to (4), the cloud server
is able to calculate
(12)
for non-leaf node .
If the data consumer has the privilege , the cloud server
can further compute
Then the server returns to the consumer and , and the
data consumer will calculate
Finally, the data consumer can recover the rest of the unit keys
according to (10).
B. Provable Security
As the CP-ABE scheme [3] is provably secure against user
collusion attack, and the difference between MCP-ABE and
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Fig. 5. The low bound of access policies vs the number of attributes.
CP-ABE is that MCP-ABE uses the intermediate result of
CP-ABE encryption to encrypt messages, this modification
does not disclose any information. Hence, MCP-ABE is secure
even if a group of user launches the collusion attack. For ex-
ample, in Fig. 4, although User 1 has the personal secret key for
attribute and User 2 has the personal secret key for attribute
, and hence they can calculate the value
and ; however, they can not calculate (or
) because the random values and are selected differently,
randomly and securely with their personal secret keys.
A greedy data consumer may try to elevate her lower privi-
lege level to a higher level. For example, suppose she has the
privilege to recover the key and tries to obtain the key .
However, this is computationally infeasible due to the one-way-
ness of the hash function used in the key chain generation.
In addition, Section VI-A enables that a consumer to offload
the time-consuming decryption to the cloud server. This of-
floading algorithm is similar to the provably-secure scheme in
[27]. Hence, it does not undermine the security level of the
MCP-ABE.
C. Flexible Access Control
In the access control scheme, a data owner defines his access
policy based on the attributes of data consumers without ex-
plicitly list their names. If the access policy can be any Boolean
functions defined with “AND”, “OR” and “NOT” operations on
attributes, the number of access policies supported is
for attributes. However, CP-ABE restricts that the attribute
negation does not exist in the Boolean functions such that the
number of supported access policies is much smaller. Nonethe-
less, the number of access policies supported by the present ac-
cess control scheme is still very large. Fig. 5 shows the low-
bound of the number of supported Boolean funcstions which
includes each attribute once only. For example, the number of
access trees is more than 8553 when there are 7 attributes in the
system. If it is necessary to handle all the access policies (or
Boolean functions), both attributes and their negations must be
included in the access tree. Ostrovsky et al.. [28] generalized
CP-ABE so as to solve this extended access control problem.
For simplicity, this paper ignores how to extend MCP-ABE to
the generalization of CP-ABE. In all, the present scheme is ca-
pable of realizing flexible access control to media content.
Fig. 6. Privilege tree for representing the relationship among the privileges,
where indicates that privilege dominates .
Sometimes, new attributes are added into the content de-
livery networks. Our scheme can cope with new attributes
easily. Specifically, once AA updates the personal secret keys
for the corresponding data consumers, any data owner is able
to incorporate the new attributes in the access policy. Hence, It
can constantly adapt to the change of user profiles.
D. Fine-Grained Access Control
The proposed scheme allows different access privileges for
the same media content. Hence, it matches the double-blindness
property in cloud computing where data consumers might be
unknown to the policy maker (i.e., the data owner) and vice
verse. In addition, from the viewpoint of data consumers, the
scheme supports flexible and scalable content rendering. For
example, if a data consumer renders an SVC video on a small-
size smartphone, she only needs to compute the unit key for the
base layer and decrypts the base layer. However, if she likes to
render the video on a desktop computer, she can decrypt all the
SVC layers so long as she has the attributes corresponding to
the highest access privilege.
In the above presentation we assumed that the access privi-
leges are totally ordered such that the unit keys form a chain.
Our access control scheme can be easily extended to support
privileges having a tree hierarchy, as shown in Fig. 6, in which
there are privileges and such that and . An
example of privileges with a tree hierarchy is when a JPEG2000
image is encoded according to both quality and resolution. The
privileges for such a JPEG2000 image can be defined in two di-
mensions such that the privileges form a tree rather than a chain.
To deal with this access policy, we can associate the unit keys
to the non-leaf nodes which corresponding to the privilege tree,
and the privilege tree is a sub-tree of the access tree elaborated in
Section III-D. The packing and unpacking algorithms are sim-
ilar to those given in Section V.
E. Lightweight Communication Overhead
Section II-A introduces the existing attribute-based access
control schemes. As those schemes employ either CP-ABE
(e.g., [9], [13]), or KP-ABE (e.g., [10]) or both (e.g., [12],
[14]), and KP-ABE has the same communication overhead
as CP-ABE, we compare CP-ABE with MCP-ABE only. To
encrypt messages, the payload for the enabling block in
CP-ABE and MCP-ABE are
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respectively, where (or ) is the size of the elements in the
group ( respectively), is the number of leaf nodes in
CP-ABE access tree on average, and is the number of leaf
nodes in the access tree for full privilege, hence,
. Their difference is
where the last inequality holds because the access trees
in CP-ABE must have all the nodes in the access tree in
MCP-ABE. Thus, MCP-ABE is much more efficient than
CP-ABE for access control of scalable media content if the
multiple-priority access policy can be represented with access
tree. But the advantage varies with the access policy. In the
worse case that each access priority is represented with one
access tree, MCP-ABE has the same communication overhead
as CP-ABE.
VII. EXPERIMENTS
A. Configuration
We set up a private cloud with three computers supporting
BIOS virtualization technology so as to simulate a group of
computers. We also set up a console withUbuntu Desktop 11.04
and use OpenStack Flat Network mode to configure the com-
puter network. In the experiments, a virtual PC (over a Dell Pre-
cision 390 with Intel Core2 Duo@2.4GHz) is used as a cloud
server for assisting decryption operations for mobile devices,
and a smartphone SAMSUNG (s5830@800MHz) is used as the
platform for a data consumer. Besides, a desktop PC is used as
AA for generating keys, and pack media data for a data owner.
To implement the access control scheme, we adopted the bi-
linear map software pbc2[29] which uses a 160-bit elliptic curve
group based on the supersingular curve over a
512-bit finite field. In addition, the hash function SHA-1 is used
to generate the key chain.
B. Experiments on Performance
In the experiments, we selected 23 video clips randomly, and
encoded them into 1 base layer and up to 3 enhancement layers,
and defined 23 access policies for distributing the content to
consumers with different access priorities. The bilinear map
software package pbc is installed at the smartphone to carry out
all the decryption operations of MCP-ABE.
1) Packing Time: Eachmedia content used in our experiment
is a presentation with one text file and an SVD sequence. The
data owner uses the notebook to generate the key chain, and
calculate the package as elaborated in Section V-C.
The presentation is packed into 3 privileges. A desktop E7200
(Intel Core2 Duo @2.53GHz) takes ms (excluding
video encoding) to pack a presentation.
2The C-language PBC library is recompiled for the dedicated smartphone and
wrapped with Java, then the wrapped code is installed on the smartphone for un-
packing. The disadvantage of this “native” programming is that one executable
may be applicable to one smartphone brand only.
Fig. 7. Communication overhead for 3-level acess.
2) Unpacking Time: Assuming a user have the privilege .
She uses the smartphone to recover the content. We adopted two
decryption scenarios for this purpose. In the first scenario, the
smartphone carries on the decryption directly to recover all the
units keys and . The decryption time is
(mean standard deviation).
In the second scenario, the decryption operation is offloaded
from smartphone to the cloud server which runs on a virtual
machine. In this case, the bilinear map software packages
and [30] are used at the cloud server. As a result, the
smartphone spends only 166 ms. Hence, offloading significantly
reduces the computational latency.
3) Communication Overhead: When a data owner brad-
casts the encrypted content, he has to broadcast the enabling
block which is the communication overhead. As a comparison,
CP-ABE is used 3 times so as to provide the multi-level access.
Fig. 7 shows the communication overhead for 3-level presen-
tation media. We observe that MCP-ABE has smaller overhead
than CP-ABE. Statiscally, the overhead of MCP-ABE is
bytes, while the overhead of CP-ABE is
bytes. We also know that the traffic overhead varies with the
access tree and the number of attributes. This is easily available
from the formulas of both MCP-ABE and CP-ABE. Besides,
the traffic overhead varies with the number of access levels too.
For example, in the experiments for the 4-level policies defined
with 7 attributes, the total traffic cost is bytes for
MCP-ABE, and bytes for CP-ABE.
C. Experiments on Access Control
To demonstrate the multi-level access control, we con-
structed a presentation with one text file and a fireman sequence
(30 frames, encoded into one base layer and two enhancement
layers, with a total 103,871 bytes), and generated the encrypted
presentation and its enabling block with the method elaborated
in Section VII-B1. A smartphone is used to carry out all the
decryption operations by exploiting the JAVA bilinear map
software package [31] after obtaining the encrypted presenta-
tion and its enabling block.
With respect to Table II, neither User 1 nor User 2 is autho-
rized to access anything; hence, their handphones output garbled
data shown in Fig. 8. User 3 is able to view the text file shown
in Fig. 9, and User 4 obtains the base layer shown in Fig. 10 in
addition to the text file in Fig. 9. User 6 gets the full content, i.e.,
WU et al.: ATTRIBUTE-BASED ACCESS TO SCALABLE MEDIA IN CLOUD-ASSISTED CONTENT SHARING NETWORKS 787
Fig. 8. Garbled text file shown to unauthorized User 1 or User 2.
Fig. 9. Clear text file shown to User 3.
Fig. 10. Base layer shown to User 4 and User 5.
the text file shown in Fig. 9 and the full video shown in Fig. 11.
In other words, MCP-ABE realizes the multi-message encryp-
tion for meeting the multi-privilege access control requirement.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In order to share media content in a controllable manner,
a suitable access control mechanism should be deployed.
CP-ABE based access control allows a data owner to enforce
access control based on attributes of data consumers without
explicitly naming the specific data consumers. However,
CP-ABE supports only one privilege level and hence is not
suitable for access control to scalable media. In this paper
we extended CP-ABE to a novel MCP-ABE and proposed a
scheme to support multi-privilege access control to scalable
media. As cloud computing is increasingly being adopted and
Fig. 11. Full video shown to User 6.
mobile devices are becoming pervasive, the present access
control scheme allows a mobile user to offload computational
intensive MCP-ABE operations to cloud servers while without
compromising user’s security. The experimental results in-
dicated that the proposed access control scheme is efficient
for securely and flexibly managing media content in large,
loosely-coupled, distributed systems.
With the assistance of the cloud server, the decryption opera-
tion is accelerated significantly at the consumer side. However,
the decryption may be still slow for low-end devices because a
modular exponentiation operation is required. Thus, one future
work is how to speed-up the decryption operation at low-end
devices.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Dr. Hui Fang set up the Cloud computing environment, and
Mr. Yifan Zhao developed some codes of MCP-ABE and car-
ried on some experiments.
REFERENCES
[1] E. Messmer, “Are security issues delaying adoption of cloud
computing?,” Network World, Apr. 2009 [Online]. Available:
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2009/042709-burning-secu-
rity-cloud-computing.html
[2] E. Messmer, “Security of virtualization, cloud computing divides
IT and security pros,” Networkworld.com, Feb. 2010 [Online].
Available: http://www.networkworld.com/news/2010/022210-virtual-
ization-cloud-security-debate.html
[3] J. Bethencourt, A. Sahai, and B. Waters, “Ciphertext-policy attribute-
based encryption,” in Proc. IEEE Symp. Security Privacy, 2007, pp.
321–334.
[4] National Inst. Standards and Technol., Secure Hash Standard (SHS),
FIPS Publication 180-1, 1995.
[5] P. Mell and T. Grance, “The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing,”
NIST Special Publication 800-145, 2011.
[6] M. D. Soete, “Attribute certificate,” in Encyclopedia of Cryptography
and Security, H. C. A. Van Tilborg and S. Jajodia, Eds., 2nd ed.
Berlin, Germany: Springer, 2011, p. 51.
788 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MULTIMEDIA, VOL. 15, NO. 4, JUNE 2013
[7] B. Carbunar, Y. Yu, W. Shi, M. Pearce, and V. Vasudevan, “Query
privace in wireless sensor networks,” ACM Trans. Sensor Networks,
vol. 6, no. 2, 2010, Art. ID 14.
[8] X. Zhang, M. Nakae, M. J. Covington, and R. Sandhu, “Toward a
usage-based security framework for collaborative computing systems,”
ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Security, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 1–36, 2008.
[9] S. Jahid, P. Mittal, and N. Borisov, “EASiER: Encryption-based access
control in social networks with efficient revocation,” in Proc. ACM
Symp. Inf. Computer Commun. Security, Mar. 2011, pp. 411–415.
[10] S. Yu, C. Wang, K. Ren, and W. Lou, “Achieving secure, scalable, and
fine-grained data access control in cloud computing,” in Proc. IEEE
Int. Conf. Comput. Commun., 2010, pp. 1–9.
[11] V. Goyal, O. Pandey, A. Sahai, and B.Waters, “Attribute based encryp-
tion for fine-grained access conrol of encrypted data,” in Proc. ACM
Conf. Comput. Commun. Security, 2006, pp. 89–98.
[12] M. Pirretti, P. Traynor, P. McDaniel, and B. Waters, “Secure attribute
based systems,” in Proc. ACMConf. Comput. Commun. Security, 2006,
pp. 99–112.
[13] J. A. Akinyele, C. U. Lehmanny, M. D. Green, M. W. Pagano, Z.
N. J. Petersonz, and A. D. Rubin, “Self-protecting electronic med-
ical records using attribute-based encryption,” in Proc. ACM Conf.
Comput. Commun. Security: Workshop on Security and Privacy in
Smartphones and Mobile Devices, Oct. 2011, pp. 75–86.
[14] R. Baden, A. Bender, N. Spring, B. Bhattacharjee, and D. Starin, “Per-
sona: An online social network with user defined privacy,” in Proc.
ACM SIGCOMM Conf. Data Commun., 2009, pp. 135–146.
[15] S. J. Wee and J. G. Apostolopoulos, “Secure scalable streaming
enabling transcoding without decryption,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf.
Image, 2001, pp. 437–440.
[16] V. Gergely and G. Feher, “Enhancing progressive encryption for
scalable video streams,” in Proc. EUNICE, Open European Summer
School and IFIP TC6.6 Workshop on The Internet of the Future, 2009,
vol. 5733, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 51–58.
[17] Y. Wu, D. Ma, and R. H. Deng, “Flexible access control to JPEG2000
image code-streams,” IEEE Trans. Multimedia, vol. 9, no. 6, pp.
1314–1324, Oct. 2007.
[18] ISO/IEC 14496-2, Coding of Audio-Visual Objects-Part 2: Visual.
[19] B. B. Zhu, C. Yuan, Y. Wang, and S. Li, “Scalable protection for
MPEG-4 fine granularity scalability,” IEEE Trans. Multimedia, vol. 7,
no. 2, pp. 222–233, Apr. 2005.
[20] T. W. H. Schwarz and D. Marpe, “Overview of the scalable video
coding extension of the h.264/avc standard,” IEEE Trans. Circuits Syst.
Video Technol., vol. 17, no. 9, pp. 1103–1120, Sep. 2007.
[21] S.-W. Park and S.-U. Shin, “Efficient selective encryption scheme for
the H.264/scalable video coding (SVC),” in Proc. Int. Conf. Networked
Computing Adv. Inf. Manag., 2008, vol. 1, pp. 371–376.
[22] S. Lian, “Secure service convergence based on scalable media coding,”
Telecommun. Syst., vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 21–35, 2010.
[23] C. Li, X. Zhou, andY. Zhong, “NAL level encryption for scalable video
coding,” in Proc. Pacific-Rim Conf. Multimedia, 2008, vol. 5353, Lec-
ture Notes in Computer Sci., pp. 496–505.
[24] G. B. Algin and E. T. Tunali, “Scalable video encryption of H.264
SVC codec,” J. Vis. Commun. Image Representation, vol. 22, no. 4,
pp. 353–364, 2011.
[25] Y. G. Won, T. M. Bae, and Y. M. Ro, “Scalable protection and access
control in full scalable video coding,” in Proc. Int. Workshop Digital
Watermarking, 2006, pp. 407–421.
[26] H. Hellwagner, R. Kuschnig, T. Stutz, and A. Uhl, “Efficient in-net-
work adaptation of encrypted H.264/SVC content,” Image Commun.,
vol. 24, no. 9, pp. 740–758, 2009.
[27] M. Green, S. Hohenberger, and B.Waters, “Outsourcing the decryption
of ABE ciphertexts,” Usenix Security, 2011.
[28] R. Ostrovsky, A. Sahai, and B. Waters, “Attribute-based encryption
with non-monotonic access structures,” in Proc. ACM Conf. Comput.
Commun. Security, 2007, pp. 195–203.
[29] Pairing-Based Cryptography Library [Online]. Available: http://crypto.
stanford.edu/pbc/
[30] J. Bethencourt, A. Sahai, and B. Waters, Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-
Based Encryption Mar. 24, 2011 [Online]. Available: http://acsc.cs.
utexas.edu/cpabe/
[31] The Java Pairing Based Cryptography Library [Online]. Available:
http://gas.dia.unisa.it/projects/jpbc/
Yongdong Wu Received the B.A and M.S. from
Beihang University, the Ph.D degree from Institute
of Automation, Chinese Academy of Science,
and Master for Management of Technology from
National University of Singapore. He is currently
a senior scientist with cryptography and Security
Department, Institute of Infocomm Research ,
A*STAR, Singapore. He is also an adjunct associate
professor with the Singapore Management Uni-
versity. His interests includes multimedia security,
e-Business, Digital Right Management and Network
security. He has published more than 100 papers, and 7 patents. His research
results and proposals was incorporated in the ISO/IEC JPEG 2000 security
standard 15444–8 in 2007. He received the Best Paper Award of the 13th Joint
IFIP TC6 & TC11 Conference on Communications and Multimedia Security
(CMS 2012).
Zhuo Wei received the B.A. degree from Jilin
University, China, the M.S. degree and PhD degree
from Huazhong University of Science and Tech-
nology, China. He is currently a research Fellow
in Singapore Management University. His interests
include image processing, and video processing. He
received the Best Paper Award of the 13th Joint IFIP
TC6 & TC11 Conference on Communications and
Multimedia Security (CMS 2012).
Robert H. Deng has been a Professor at the School
of Information Systems, Singapore Management
University since 2004. Prior to this, he was Principal
Scientist and Manager of Infocomm Security Depart-
ment, Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore.
His research interests include data security and
privacy, multimedia security, network and system
security. He was the Associate Editor of the IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
from 2009 to 2012. He is currently Associate Editor
of IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure
Computing, Associate Editor of Security and Communication Networks (John
Wiley), and a member of Editorial Board of Journal of Computer Science and
Technology (the Chinese Academy of Sciences). He is the co-chair of the
Steering Committee of the ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and
Communications Security (ASIACCS).
He received the University Outstanding Researcher Award from the National
University of Singapore in 1999 and the Lee Kuan Yew Fellow for Research
Excellence from the Singapore Management University in 2006. He was
named Community Service Star and Showcased Senior Information Security
Professional by (ISC) under its Asia-Pacific Information Security Leadership
Achievements program in 2010. He received the Distinguished Paper Award of
the 19th Annual Network & Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS
2012) and the Best Paper Award of the 13th Joint IFIP TC6 & TC11 Conference
on Communications and Multimedia Security (CMS 2012).
